Black People in White Face: Assimilation, Culture, and the Brown Case by Culp, Jerome McCristal, Jr.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 36 | Issue 2 Article 8
Black People in White Face: Assimilation, Culture,
and the Brown Case
Jerome McCristal Culp Jr.
Copyright c 1995 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Jerome McCristal Culp Jr., Black People in White Face: Assimilation, Culture, and the Brown Case, 36
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 665 (1995), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss2/8
BLACK PEOPLE IN WHITE FACE: ASSIMILATION,
CULTURE, AND THE BROWN CASE
JEROME M. CULP, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is difficult to criticize a case that no longer stands for a
legal point, becoming instead a central part of the social mythol-
ogy of the country Brown v. Board of Educatwn1 has, from the
beginmng, been more than just a law suit. In recent years,
Brown's legal foundation-or at least what people interpret to be
its core rationale-is one of the few issues that has served as a
litmus test for judicial or civil rights appointees. For instance,
the view that Robert Bork, Lam Gumer, and Lino Graglia were
not committed to "the" common understanding of Brown empow-
ered the opposition to their appointments.2 Although a number
of authors have recently questioned the importance or power of
* Professor of Law, Duke Umversity School of Law. I would like to thank my
research assistants Frank Cooper and Kevin Vilke for their help. The conference on
the fortieth anniversary of Brown brought together some of the great people, black
and white, that helped to produce the Brown decision. I had the great honor of
clerking for Judge Nathaniel Jones, one of the successors of Thurgood Marshall as
chief counsel of the NAACP, and the joy of getting to know Judge Damon Keith
when I was a law clerk for Judge Jones. Judges Jones and Keith are Circuit Judges
for the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Their desire for justice
and ability to search and often find justice for Americans of all races and to do so
without rancor has been an inspiration to me and is a reflection of the work of all
of those who helped to produce Brown and those, like Judges Keith and Jones, who
have carried forward that work as lawyers, judges, and citizens.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. The view that Lai Gunner's ideas were out of the mainstream was pushed
by groups and individuals who themselves were not in the mainstream. See, e.g.,
Clint Bolick, Quota Queens, WALL. ST. J., Apr. 30, 1993, at A12. Mr. Bolick, a friend
of Clarence Thomas, is both more libertarian and conservative than the country. In
a conversation with Judge Damon Keith, I learned that the news media treated Mr.
Bolick as if he were mainstream while at the same time refusing to publish main-
stream responses by black supporters of Professor Gunner. Professor Gunner's views
and work are very consistent with traditional views of Brown and the promise of
Brown. See, e.g., LANI GuIIMR, TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY (1994).
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the opimon,3 Brown stands as the orthodoxy that people can
shoot at but not destroy-an orthodoxy that is often deaf to
dissent and misunderstands the power of its own efforts to de-
stroy racial segregation. This lack of responsiveness is particu-
larly true of the dissent of black people who were the "beneficia-
res" of Brown.4
The difficulty in understanding Brown's actual accomplish-
ments manifests itself most clearly in the debates that surround
the "ungrateful" black students on white campuses. Black stu-
dents are seen as insular because they segregate themselves at
black tables and in black dorms, unappreciative of what Brown
brought to their college campuses. Last year, for example, black
students at the Umversity of North Carolina in Chapel Hill
demanded from a recalcitrant admimstration that the umversity
create, or-after they were able to secure financial support from
Michael Jordan's mother-permit the creation of a black cultural
center on campus.5 Paul Hardin, Chancellor of the Umversity of
North Carolina and dedicated and principled liberal,' appeared
3. See SHADES OF BROWN (Derrick Bell ed., 1979); Michael J. Klarman, Brown,
Ractal Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994). But see
David J. Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History: Revstonst Devaluing of Brown v. Board
of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 151 (1994) (stating that the deep seated desire for
novelty has led Professor Klarman to rhetorical excesses not supported by the re-
cord, which diminish the power and importance of Brown); Mark Tushnet, The Sig-
nificance of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 173 (1994) (observing that
even though the importance of Brown has been overstated by lawyers, Professor
Klarman misunderstood the importance of Brown).
4. This is one of the inconsistencies of Brown and the liberal orthodoxy that
supports it. Brown has to help both the oppressed and the oppressors so that chang-
es in racial oppression alter the status quo. How we change the status quo deter-
mines the division of resources. White people, as well as the black beneficiaries,
gained from Brown. White teachers gained at the expense of black teachers. Clearly,
poor whites gained from the changes in the economic and social status quo although
many of them thought they lost something as well-the power to be seen as white
and not black. White, businessmen gained the right to employ black labor more free-
ly-creating more competition among employees, lower wages, and a more educated
work force. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that employ-
ment cannot be determined by race).
5. Joe Drape, UNC Faces Turmoil over Black Cultural Center, ATLANTA J., Sept.
13, 1992, at A3.
6. Chancellor Hardin graduated from Duke in 1952 and from Duke Law School
in 1954. He was a member of the Duke Law Faculty for ten years where he was a
leader in speaking out for the welfare of the largely black cleaning staff and other
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to do everything in his power to avoid meeting the students'
demand. He said he was afraid of separatism and balkamzation
among students.7 Chancellor Hardin, a good and decent man,
first argued that the umversity did not have the resources to
undertake such an endeavor.' He then argued against locating
the cultural center near the center of campus.' He resisted the
students' demands that the center be placed near the seats of
intellectual and institutional power on the central campus.' ° In
previous years, a number of black students objected to the por-
trayal of black students in an art work that has one male black
student twirling a basketball and one black female figure carry-
ing books on her head." These and other incidents on campus-
es across the country prompted Garry Trudeau to create a
Doonesbury comic strip in which black students demanded sepa-
rate water fountains. 12 In the view of many people-including
some people who fought very hard for the kinds of changes that
occurred as a result of Brown-black students' demands amount
to a return to the "bad old" days of racial separation and segre-
gation. The Trudeau cartoon illustrated what many people be-
lieve: that our desire for the full integration of black Americans
has come full circle." Many white liberals, and a few blacks,
contend that African Americans are now not part of the solution
but instead part of the problem.
I used two incidents from the University of North Carolina
similar issues.
7. Drape, supra note 5, at A3.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
Two years ago, students bitterly protested a sculpture called "The Stu-
dent Body," wuch was donated by the class of '85 and placed by the
library. Black students felt the sculpture depicted insulting stereotypes of
a black man spinning a basketball on his finger and a black woman
carrying books on her head. The sculpture was moved to a less conspicu-
ous site after much debate. Still, black students say the incident caused
them undue embarrassment.
Id.
12. G.B. Trudeau, Doonesbury, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1993 (Sunday Comics sec-
tion).
13. See id.
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partially because they are and were at the forefront of legal
change from the racial separation that was most pronounced in
that section of our country 14 Chapel Hill was the first major
town in the South to elect a black mayor."5 Chapel Hill also has
a large and significant black student population-something
many other institutions in both northern and southern states,
including my own, have had a hard time achieving. Chapel Hill
and the angst associated with its travails, however, is symptom-
atic of the problems that plague almost every major institution
that has accepted black students in numbers.
I do not want to ask whether Brown was important. To me
that question, while worth debating and revisiting, is ultimately
uninteresting. I want to ask a different question about Brown's
importance. Why hasn't Brown achieved all that its supporters
hoped? Put differently, I ask not how has Brown succeeded, but
why has Brown failed in many ways to achieve the ambitions of
those who fought and bled to achieve that victory? Accordingly,
although I will not discuss primarily the achievements of
Brown-important achievements that ought to be celebrated on
Brown's fortieth anniversary-Brown clearly changed how we
think about the society we live in.
Brown has failed-failed to create the racial nirvana in our
nation's classrooms and failed to eliminate completely the vestig-
es of racial segregation and oppression in the nation. Race mat-
ters in this country in ways that have recently been documented
by Professor Derrick Bell," and race matters in our country's
classrooms. In addition, as I noted above, black students, law-
14. It is important to remember that discrimination was not limited to the South.
There were official and unofficial prejudices that controlled the lives of African
Americans throughout the United States almost since the first African American set
foot on this continent. See Nathaniel R. Jones, The Desegregation of Urban Schools
Thirty Years After Brown, 55 U. COLO. L. REv. 515 (1984) (describing some of the
northern school cases and the discrimination that existed); see also Milliken v.
Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Segregation in Rockport (ABC television broadcast,
Feb. 17, 1994), available in LEXIS, News Library, ABCNEW File.
15. Howard Lee, the first African American mayor of Chapel Hill, is now es-
tranged from some of his former liberal white supporters who opposed him in his
most recent successful reelection campaign for a seat in the North Carolina Senate.
16. Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363 (1992) (arguing that black
Americans need to change their civil rights strategies due to the failure of equality
jurisprudence to improve their lives).
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yers, judges, and other successful African Americans have not
always found the results of Brown as meaningful as they would
like in their own lives or the lives of contemporaries or their
children.'
These failures stem from three common misconceptions that
were at the heart of the Brown decision and its liberal policy
The most important misconception was that if we changed the
law of the land, "good" people would comply with it. However,
preventing those "good" people from using ruses to achieve their
cherished ends served by racial segregation has proven difficult.
For example, when courts create "ability tracks" that leave black
children racially segregated and alone and then misapply these
standards of ability, the difficulty of assuming that good people
will live up to the requirements of Brown becomes apparent.
Just as political institutions did not live up to the "separate but
equal" doctrine in Plessy, they have not lived up to Brown's
requirement of equality free of racial segregation. I call this
misconception the "compliance assumption."
The second misconception is that there is a race neutral policy
that we can all agree on that will achieve racial justice. The
problem that a number of cases have demonstrated is that there
is no race neutral standard." Brown's requirement of ending
segregation is not the answer, and judges and legal scholars are
as yet unable to create a neutral policy In addition, as many
scholars have argued, such a policy in many ways is impossible
to achieve. 9 I call this misconception the "neutrality assump-
tion."
The final misconception at the heart of the Brown decision is
that a single standard of assimilation can be articulated for
American society, and that black people will be willing to adhere
17. See ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS (1993) (arguing that fur-
ther progress toward the goal of equal justice under law can only be initiated by our
nation's government).
18. See, e.g., Ayers v. Allain, 893 F.2d 732, 743 (5th Cir. 1993) (commenting on
different interpretations of the proper standard to apply).
19. See, e.g., Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Firing Legal Canons and Shooting Blanks:
Finding a Neutral Way in the Law, 10 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 185, 191-95
(1991); Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal
Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2128, 2137-42 (1989).
1995] 669
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
to that standard. This requirement of black assimilation is akin
to a requirement that black people put on white face and is
ultimately unacceptable as a goal for a decolonized African
American community This desire for assimilation promotes the
conclusion that it is permissible to create white culture but dan-
gerous to have black culture on campuses or in the curriculum
because it will politicize our universities. I call this misconcep-
tion of the Brown orthodoxy the "assimilation assumption."
If Brown is to "succeed," the political and social network of
society must reject all three of these assumptions. Despite Gerry
Spann's reminder that courts cannot be the only source for, or
the main engine of, political change, failure to understand these
misconceptions may mean that courts will not play even a limit-
ed role in "permitting change.""
II. THE "COMPLIANCE ASSUMPTION"
The only significant civil rights measure to survive the in-
passe [during Truman's second teris] was desegregation of
the armed services, which the president achieved through
executive orders that placed it effectively beyond the reach of
Congress. Even so, it required a great deal of internal push-
ing and shoving to bring it about m the face of the outspoken
opposition of the star-spangled generals As Army chief
of staff, General Eisenhower declared the armed forces un-
ready "spiritually, philosophically or mentally to absorb
blacks and whites together." Even after the order was m
effect, his successor, General Omar Bradley, insisted that the
Army "is not out to make any social reforms. The Army will
put men of different races in different companies. It will
change that policy when the nation as a whole changes it."21
At the heart of the Brown decision was a nuscalculation about
20. See Jerome M. Culp, Jr., An Open Letter from One Black Scholar to Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Or, How Not To Become Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, 1
DUKE J. GENDER L. & PoLY 21 (1994) (arguing that Justice O'Connor's judicial re-
cord enforces a racial status quo that is reminiscent of the reconstruction era Court
and is likely to produce the same result of racial stagnation in society unless the
Justices are more concerned with how they deal with racial injustice).
21. HARRY S. ASHMORE, CIVIL RIGHTS AND WRONGS: A MEMOIR OF RACE AND
POLITICS 1944-1994, at 86-87.(1994).
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"good" people. Those who fought for Brown understood that
many in the South and the North would oppose vigorously the
ending of any significant part of the legal racial apartheid.
These early proponents of Brown probably misunderstood the
depths of that reaction. I am sure that they predicted that at
least some black children would be attending desegregated
schools in every southern state six years after Brown was decid-
ed. They were wrong. They understood the fight against the.
Ross Barnetts and the Orville Faubuses, the most vocal oppo-
nents of social equality for black Americans in these southern
states. Apparently, they did not appreciate the extent of the
opposition among those not overtly and forthrightly opposed to
desegregation.
Sometimes "good" people were the problem in small and large
ways. Forced desegregation of southern schools often resulted in
the unnecessary elimnation of the jobs of excellent black teach-
ers and all of the "black" cultural aspects of schools that had
been segregated for black children. The existing power structure
viewed black teachers as inferior and black schools as "too
black" for white children. Black children were made to bear a
disproportionate share of the cost of integration-leaving their
schools and friends for what became, in many situations, hostile
territory When a friend of mine who grew up in Northern Vir-
gima near Washington, D.C., went to a newly integrated grade
school in the 1960s, she was greeted with comments like "the
little migger girl wants to talk" whenever she raised her hand in
class. Her teacher may have thought of herself as simply defend-
ing the honor of the Commonwealth of Virginia, but she was a
part of the problem.
Many were opposed to altering the racial status quo. They
were not always direct m their actions, but they often increased
the cost to those who were in the front lines of the fight for
change. In addition, other teachers and administrators who
thought black children were inferior but expressed it without the
anger, were also involved in making integration a difficult and
costly task. These individuals, both black and white, took black
inferiority as a given and made it more difficult for black chil-
dren to succeed. Brown assumed that it would be possible to
achieve integration by simply altering the legal regime that
1995]
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supported "separate but equal." Brown and its progeny did not
consider that "good" people would be part of the problem.
We see aspects of this today when people who were active and
important participants in the fight for racial justice demonstrate
the belief that the largest problem for racial integration is recal-
citrant black students. Professor C. Vann Woodward, whose life
long commitment studying southern history and Jim Crow and
the system they spawned, helped to enlighten the courts about
the power of racial oppression in the period after reconstruc-
tion.22 Professor Woodward has become part of this chorus of
criticism of black students on white campuses. He questions
whether their desire to be free of racial slurs on these campuses
is a threat to the ability of college campuses to be places of free
exchange of ideas. Similar claims have been made by Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr., in his book on multiculturalism.' Professor
Schlesinger defends the need for the adoption of a common cul-
ture and sees multiculturalism and black cultural movements as
threats to the unity of the American spirit.24 Similarly, when
Justice White concluded that black plaintiffs in United States v.
Fordice25 sought to upgrade black colleges in the state of Mis-
sissippi "so that they may be publicly financed, exclusively black
enclaves by private choice,"2" he distorted the history of black
colleges and white colleges in the country in general and Missis-
sippi in particular. The demands of the black plaintiffs in
Fordice were more thoughtful and responsive. Justice White
assumed by the way that he characterized the demands of the
black plaintiffs that to demand a black cultural dimension to
Mississippi education was to do violence to the right of the ma-
jority to define blackness as inferior.27 The legacy of Brown as-
22. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d rev. ed.,
1974).
23. ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON A
MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY (1992).
24. Id. at 9-20.
25. 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
26. Id. at 2743.
27. See id. In their brief, the black plaintiffs said:
In Mississippi, the HBIs [Historically Black Institutions] have, in the
main, been fulfilling the responsibility of educating the black citizenry-a
task allocated to them by Board admission standards and practices of the
[Vol. 36:665672
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sumes that these "good people" or people of goodwill will be
committed to the alteration of our society In many ways, Justice
White and Professors Schlesinger and Woodward have remained
committed to an elimination of the ills of segregation and some-
times of racial oppression, but goodness or goodwill are not
enough. Other factors determine the extent to which these con-
cerns are addressed by the courts and by the law Brown did not
understand this truth about the law or people. If justice is to
occur for people of color in this country, then we must examine
the actual success of the efforts of "good" people in the elimina-
tion of racial oppression and compare this success with the ex-
tent to which these efforts simply operate to keep black people
economically and politically stagnant. 8
HWIs [Historically White Institutions]. The ensuing "transition" should, m
keeping with Milliken, and the authorities requiring that each vestige of
discrimination be addressed, witness more education for black citizens,
their increased access to HWIs, as well as steps to bring about substan-
tial white enrollment at HBIs-not reduced black enrollment and the de-
struction of the principal proven instrumentality (the HBIs) for educating
the victims of discrimination.
Brief of Petitioners at 68, Ayers v. Mabus, 499 U.S. 958 (No. 90-6588), granting cert.
to Ayers v. Allan, 914 F.2d 676 (5th Cir.), vacated sub nom. United States v.
Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992). In a footnote to this text, the plaintiffs said:
Similarly, there is every reason to believe that as these changes
continue and remedies remove the impact of prior discrimination at th
[sic] HBIs, one will witness substantial numbers of Afro-Americans and
white persons receiving education at HBIs in the future. There are
large numbers of white high school graduates who could take advan-
tage of the historic interest of the HBIs in those who perform less well
at the high school level.
Id. at 68 n.140. The plaintiffs also quoted the Office of Civil Rights Regulation:
The Department [of Education] does not take this language to mean that
the traditionally black institutions are exempt from the Constitution or
the requirements of Title VI. To the contrary, traditionally black and tra-
ditionally white institutions are subject to the same constitutional and
congressional mandate to provide ai education to all citizens without
discrimination or segregation. White and black institutions are to function
as part of a unitary system free of the vestiges of state imposed racial
segregation. [T]he transition to a unitary system must not be accom-
plished by placing a disproportionate burden upon black students, faculty,
or institutions or by reducing the educational opportunities currently
available to blacks.
Id. at 69 (alterations in original) (quoting Revised Criteria, 43 Fed. Reg. 32, 6660
(1978)).
28. See Culp, supra note 20 (arguing that Justice O'Connor has helped eliminate
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We see the problem with the compliance assumption in
Grimes v. Sobol.29 In that case, plaintiffs, a class purporting to
represent all African-American students and their parents, chal-
lenged the failure of the New York public schools to include the
experiences and history of blacks in their curriculum." The
plaintiffs' action under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act"'
failed because, as the court concluded, Title VI was not in place
to permit challenges to the curricular decisions of school admin-
istrators. 2 Judge Wood held that Congress, in passing Title VI,
and the Executive, in administering it, chose not to include
school curricula in the coverage of the Act because of potential
First Amendment conflicts and concerns about federal courts
and federal regulators becoming curricular censors.3 In es-
sence, Judge Wood concluded that Title VI, a descendant of the
principles of Brown, would rely on the goodwill of school admin-
istrators and on the political process to provide for equality This
view of the goodwill of the administrators of the New York City
school system-a system that is controlled by a process in which
black and other children of color represent a majority of the
city's school children but a minority in the political pro-
cess-may leave black children's concerns outside the curricular
concerns of school board members. If some school boards and
some places remain infected with vestiges of racial oppression
and want to ignore the concerns of black children, they have a
right to do so under the "compliance assumption." "Good will
win in the end" is the assumption that characterizes the Brown
decision and its modern-day progeny
Testifying to the failure of that assumption, however, the Civil
Rights Division of the Justice Department recently decided to
make the elimination of racial tracking a priority after evidence
alternatives for black progress and has become an enforcer of the status quo).
29. 832 F Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
30. Id. at 706-07.
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d5 (1988).
32. Grtmes, 832 F Supp. at 713. Plaintiffs also sought to challenge the curricular
choices by pointing to the Constitution and to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 707. Plain-
tiffs could not prove a violation of the Constitution under § 1983 because they could
not prove that the discrimination was intentional. Id. at 708-09.
33. Id. at 711-12.
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came to light that some school districts were tracking black and
white children into different classrooms independent of test
scores. 4 The assumption we have made about desegregation is
that if we give school admimstrators clear rules, they will act
without bias, or if there is bias, it will be limited to the bad
people who really hate black Americans. Our experience with
racial discrimination in education proves that the problems are
more deeply entrenched in our system than that. At the heart of
this dilemma is the problem of assuming that "good" people will
comply with what they know to be goodness without prodding. If
our history of race and racism has taught us anything, it is that
this assumption rarely applies to "good" people and that not all
people are, in fact "good." I do not imply that good people have
not taken some positive steps to reduce racial oppression in this
country The point I want to make, however, is that no single
"good" act is sufficient. Indeed, our history teaches us that dis-
crimination takes many forms, and our efforts to limit its impact
therefore require zealous attention to the vagaries of that di-
vergent experience." Good people must comply with both the
letter and spirit of the law Unfortunately, they are rarely able
to do so. Many "good" people assume, like President Eisenhower,
that many problems more important than race require more
immediate action. 6 Goodness is not enough if it leaves the sta-
tus quo in place.
III. THE NEUTRALITY AND ASSIMILATION ASSUMPTIONS
Give us the ballot-and we will transform the salient mis-
deeds of bloodthirsty mobs into abiding good deeds of orderly
34. Civil-Rights Chief Patrick Speaks His Mind, LEGAL TIMES, May 30, 1994, at 9.
35. See NEIL R. MCMILLEN, DARK JOURNEY: BLACK MISSISSIPPIANS IN THE AGE OF
JIM CROW (1989) (contending that Jim Crow was manifested in different ways in
Mississippi and across the South, but common to these manifestations was a desire
to keep blacks in their place no matter the method of control and degradation neces-
sary).
36. See ASIIORE, supra note 21, at 138. After a 1957 meeting at the White
House, in which Martin Luther King, Jr. appealed for federal support, President
Eisenhower, while walking his guest out, murmured, "Reverend, there are so many
problems Lebanon, Algeria " Id.
1995] 675
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citizens.
Give us the ballot-and we will fill the legislative halls
with men of good will.
Give us the ballot [now the crowd was chanting the open-
ing line with hii]-and we will place judges on the benches
of the South who will do justice and love mercy
Give us the ballot-and we will quietly and nonviolently,
without rancor and bitterness, implement the Supreme
Court's decision of May 17, 1954."7
The second reason that Brown has failed is the strong belief
that a common, race-neutral policy can be articulated. This "neu-
trality assumption" plagues much of current constitutional inter-
pretation. When, for example, Martin Luther King, Jr., called for
ballot access for black Americans, presumably Americans, at
least in the long run, could agree on that as a goal. However,
the tortured history of the Voting Rights Act of 19658 demon-
strates the difficulty of building such a consensus. For example,
in Shaw v. Reno,39 Justice O'Connor stated that a particular re-
districting plan that created two majority black congressional
districts cannot be understood as anything other than an effort
to classify and separate voters by race0 and that such a plan
"reinforces racial stereotypes and threatens to undermine our
system of representative democracy by signaling to elected offi-
cials that they represent a particular racial group rather than
their constituency as a whole."4 The Court in Shaw considered
the majority black districts to be oddly structured.42 The "neu-
tral position" that Justice O'Connor would have the Court adopt,
and black citizens of North Carolina accept, leaves a permanent
white majority in control of the political concerns of North Caro-
lina in Congress-unless by chance a black person were elected.
Justice O'Connor stated that race will matter to the black cit-
37. Id. at 137-38 (quoting Martin Luther King, Jr. speaking exactly three years
after Brown I on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial at a prayer pilgrimage attended
by approximately 25,000 people, most of whom were black).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1988).
39. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
40. See id. at 2828.
41. Id.
42. See td. at 2819-21.
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izens who might be elected to represent districts in North Caro-
lina but that it will not matter to the white representatives
elected in their stead by a process that is controlled by racial
block voting. Existing empmcal evidence does not support Jus-
tice O'Connor's neutral assertion of a lack of white interest or
even the exclusion of white interests by black representatives.
In the same manner that Justice O'Connor found the chal-
lenge by the five white citizens did not have a race component,
or at least not one that they asserted, to require any legal conse-
quence,4" she assumed that white interests-because they are a
majority in the state and country as a whole-do not have a
racial context. Likewise, Justice O'Connor contended in her
concurrence in Johnson v. De Grandy" that there is no require-
ment under section two of the Voting Rights Act to maximize
the electoral districts that "can" elect minority representatives
and that proportionality or the lack thereof is not dispositive in
deternming whether the voting interests of any group is im-
properly affected.45 In essence, in De Grandy, Justice O'Connor
said to the hispanic and black communities that because the
legislature decided not to maximize their interests, they do not
have a valid claim for relief. Conversely, white citizens, whose
"access to the political process" is not impeded by districts no
more odd than those of majority white districts, have been in-
jured.46 This neutral position enforces the existing power of the
white majority to dominate the concerns of black citizens.47 Jus-
tice O'Connor arrives at these conclusions by assuming away the
concerns of black Americans. In Shaw after all, whether the
Supreme Court's rule or the lower court's rule would lead to a
more integrated nation is an empirical question. O'Connor's view
43. See id. at 2824.
44. 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994).
45. Id. at 2664 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
46. Id.
47. The fact that some black people may agree with this view of the law does not
render it an obvious or neutral position. See Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2591
(1994) (Thomas, J., concurring). Ignoring more than twenty years of court interpreta-
tion and two reenactments of the Voting Rights Act, Justice Thomas suggests that
we ought to interpret § 2 to protect only election procedures. Id. at 2603. This view
echoes the majority opinions m the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy v. Ferguson in its
effort to ignore the racial realities of black voters.
1995] 677
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of integration assumes facts about the process and ignores the
importance and power of community in the short run to alleviate
the issues of racial discrinnation and isolation. This view also
assumes that integration is required of black and hispamc com-
munities in a world where political power and progress may
require desegregation and not integration. My point is not that
the Court could not weigh the issues associated with voting and
reach the result articulated in Justice O'Connor's opimon in
Shaw, but that O'Connnor does not address all pertinent con-
cerns in her analysis. She assumes a neutral starting place as to
how to govern this country that ignores black interests and con-
cerns.
The assumption that all blacks seek or should seek assimila-
tion is one of the neutral rules that courts have imposed on the
discourse between black and white communities. This view is
most evident in education where debate continues over the pos-
sible forms of relief available to redress the unconstitutional ra-
cial discrimination suffered by blacks and others and over when
that relief should end. In some sense the question in both in-
stances is the same: What is the ultimate aim of eliminating
discrimination? The courts have consistently answered this
question by assuming that assimilation and cultural degradation
were the only two courses available. In Brown I," the Court
said that desegregation should proceed with "all deliberate
speed" not because the Court wished to protect the culture or
values of the black community, but because the Court assumed
that there were no values worth protecting in the black commu-
nity 49 As others have noted, the Court found a constitutional
violation but delayed the elimination of the constitutional
harms.0 The Court has begun to end the brief period of effec-
tive enforcement of remedies for discrimination in the provision
of school services, but it has again failed to deal with the ques-
48. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
49. Id. at 301.
50. See, e.g., Louis Lusky, The Stereotype: Hard Core of Racism, 13 BUFF. L. REV.
450, 457-59 (1964). Professor Lusky suggests that Brown was the first time the
Court ignored- remedying constitutional harm suffered by individual plaintiffs in
order to fashion a remedy for an entire class of individuals in similar circumstances.
Id. at 458. Some Native American litigants might disagree with this observation.
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tion of how these concerns will influence the black community
In a similar fashion black interests on college campuses seem
to be outside the purview of school admimnistrators. Black stu-
dents who sit together in an effort to create a community in a
world where their interests and views are often excluded are
seen as the fundamental problem preventing the success of inte-
gration on college campuses. When the students at the Universi-
ty of North Carolina sought to have a black cultural center
placed at the heart of the college campus, in the only open space
left near the center of campus, their demands were seen as mili-
tant and inappropriate. Editorials denounced them for their ef-
frontery of wanting to make some part of the University of
North Carolina respond to black concerns." What caused this
anger at the effort of black students to make themselves partic-
ipants in the university's activities? The only plausible answer is
that many participants in the civil rights struggle, important
and able participants, thought that black people were agreeing
to a "neutral principle" of assimilation. Black students would
become white students with black faces and our college campus-
es would not change at all. The issues we discuss, the concerns
we emphasize, and the programs we administer would remain
the same, only the complexions of some in the classroom and
perhaps at the podium would be altered.
This view of black students as passive participants in a pro-
cess that is not responsive to their needs is reflected in the rhet-
orc of the debate surrounding the controversy at the University
of North Carolina. Paul Hardin initially opposed the creation of
a black cultural center because of the possibility that it would
become a fortress.52 Some students thought the issue of the
51. See, e.g., Stephen Buckley, Black Like Fewer of Us-Soon We Won't Be the
Majority Minority, WASH. POST, July 18, 1993, at C5.
52. Vern E. Smith, A Place To Call Their Own, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 12, 1992, at 92.
Mr. Smith reported:
Hardin had initially objected to the center, saying it would increase ra-
cial separatism on the campus, where blacks make up only about 8 per-
cent of the 23,000 member student body. "What's broken my heart is
that I've been portrayed as a '60s liberal who stopped growing," he says.
"I believe in the legitimacy of a black-culture center. I'm not an oppo-
nent."
Id., see also Drape, supra note 5. According to Drape:
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"blackness" of the cultural center could be avoided by making it
a multicultural center for all "diverse interests" on campus.53
After substantial protests by black students, alumm, and nation-
al black leaders, the university agreed to build the center but
opposed making it too large and fought having it situated in the
last open space in the heart of the campus.' As Chuck Stone
has noted, Chancellor Hardin is a person of goodwill,5 but the
problem for black students who sought to participate in the so-
cial and political life of the University of North Carolina is that
they were limited to being participants in an endeavor where
the university that did not give them access to a ballot-a voice
the Sonja Haynes Stone Black Cultural Center looks like the renovated
snack bar it is, rather than the powerful symbol it has become. Inside
glass walls, young men and women have spent a year planning how to
turn this fishbowl into a showplace for African-American arts and letters.
University of North Carolina administrators first said they were
broke-so the students lined up donors. Next, officials asked where would
it go, and the young people found a site in the heart of student life on
the southwest corner of Polk Place. Then, when Chancellor Paul Hardin
voiced concern that a free-standing building might be perceived as a
"fortress" that would promote racial separatism, the struggle became a
'60s-style movement.
Id.
53. See Morning Edition (NPR Radio Broadcast, Sept. 23, 1992), available in
LEXIS, News Library, NPR File.
Molpus: Some black students also express misgivings about the way
things are going. They say whites need to be less suspicious and blacks
need to ratchet down the rhetoric. A few students are searching for a
compromise. Cheryl Preshau, a student from India, is helping to form a
group promoting a multicultural center that would incorporate Asians,
Native Americans, Hispanics and blacks.
Id.
54. Dispute over Black Center Tears U. of North Carolina, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21,
1993, at Bii.
55. Drape, supra note 5, at A3.
Chuck Stone, who holds the Walter Spearman chair in the School of
Journalism, says the vilification of Mr. Hardin is unfortunate. "He's a
man of good will," said Mr. Stone, who holds one of 13 endowed chairs
that belong to blacks at the university. Mr. Stone also conducted the
study that showed of the 56 endowed chairs blacks hold nationwide,
UNC offered more than three times as many .as second-place Princeton
University. "This is a progressive place, but the young brothers and sis-
ters do not think it is moving fast enough," he said. "I understand in
honest, well-meaning people, free-standing connotes separate."
Id. (emphasis added).
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in the process of defimng the issues and the culture of the Um-
versity of North Carolina.56 Some of the black student support-
ers of the Black Cultural Center said some foolish things about
some of the opponents of the center, white people, and sup-
porters of Chancellor Hardin," but one reason people are loud
is that their ability to participate has been limited by refusals to
be heard. It is not possible to get useful responses to these is-
sues if we assume that the only good students effectively have to
put on white face. There is nothing wrong with desegregation of
schools, but the willingness of black people to acquiesce to as-
similation requires careful consideration by the black commum-
ty It is not enough to assume that assimilation is the only an-
swer.
IV CONCLUSION
We know more specifically, I take it, that Othello's
blackness means something. But what specifically does it
mean? Mean, I mean, to.bim-for otherwise it is not Othello's
color that we are interested in but some generalized
blackness, meamng perhaps "sooty" or "filthy" as elsewhere
in the play This difference may show in the way one takes
Desdemona's early statement: "I saw Othello's visage in his
mind." I think it is commonly felt that she means she over-
looked his blackness in favor of his inner brilliance; and per-
haps further felt that this is a piece of deception, at least of
herself. But what the line more naturally says is that she
saw his visage as he sees it, that she understands his black-
ness as he understands it, as the expression of his
mind-which is not overlooking it. Then how does he under-
stand it? As the color of a romantic hero. For he, as he was
and is, manifested by his parts, his title, and Ins "perfect
soul .5
What did "black" mean to the Supreme Court in 1954 and
1955 when the Brown cases were decided? Clearly the Court saw
56. Id.
57. See Morning Edition, supra note 53.
58. STANLEY CAVELL, DISOWNING KNOWLEDGE: IN SIX PLAYS OF SHAKESPEARE 129
(1987).
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the world mainly through lenses of the white majority It sought
to make black people white people with black skin. The Court
and the educational establishment have had a much more dif-
ficult time accommodating the interests, culture, and lives of
black Americans.59 Was the Court populated by "good people?"
Certainly, those who were on either side of the line thought the
participants in the American form of racial oppression were good
men. The southern governors who fought desegregation tooth
and nail were thought to be "good people." The administrators of
segregated public institutions knew themselves to be "good peo-
ple." The school board members in southern school districts that
discriminated in pay for black teachers and in services between
black and white children knew themselves to be "good people."
The Supreme Court Justices who unammously supported the
Brown decisions thought of themselves as "good people" despite
whatever prejudices they still harbored. I raise this issue to
suggest that there remains in all of us vestiges of racism that
still distort our present. Being "good," while better than being
"bad" is not sufficient to cure our racial present. The gains that
have been made in this country for black Americans would not
have been possible without "good" people, black and white. How-
ever, there is a tendency in all of us to interpret one act of good-
will as a form of perpetual dispensation from the racism that
exists and influences the lives of black elementary, high school,
and college students." If we are to reach the promise suggested
by the powerful and noble ideal of Brown, we have to rethink
the question of exactly how we see "black." White Americans
have to accommodate black interests and concerns. Liberal
scholars often look at this issue by seeing race in the same way
as the readers of Othello-as something that Desdemona ought
to overlook, as something outside useful analysis. At least in
America, race is not equivalent to poverty or class. The sugges-
tions by the Supreme Court or others6' that racial problems can
59. See, e.g., Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Water Buffalo and Diversity: Naming Names
and Reclaiming the Racial Discourse, 26 CONN. L. REV. 209 (1993) (citing examples
of the failures of the Supreme Court and universities m addressing racial issues).
60. See id. at 212 (noting that freedom from racism involves more than doing one
particular nonracist action).
61. See, e.g., Steven A. Holmes, A Rights Leader Minimizes Racism as a Poverty
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always be cured by addressing poverty or class concerns are
wrong.
If we are to answer the demand of Martin Luther King on the
steps of the Lincoln Memorial to allow blacks to have the bal-
lot-by which I think he meant to become a real participant in
the decision-making process of society-white America has to
change how we interpret the promise of Brown. Brown has to
become more than just a slogan for the racial status quo and
assimilation. For me, race is part of the law- not something to be
put aside, but instead, to paraphrase Cavell, something to be
understood from the perspective of black people.62 Not black
people in white face, but simply people with much to contribute
to our society including their blackness as they define it.
Factor, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1994, at 18. The first public pronouncement of the new
head of the Urban League was to claim that white racism, though relevant and
important, is not the most important social problem for black Americans. Id. This
argument ignores the structural factors that limit the likely success of this sugges-
tion. See Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of Op-
pression: Policy Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 163
(1994); Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Neutrality, the Race Question, and the 1991 Civil Rights
Act: The "Impossibility" of Permanent Reform, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 965 (1993).
62. See Cavell, supra note 58, at 129.
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